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v 
Abstract 
Skilled perceptual anticipation, the capability of anticipating the actions of others and 
processing information under severe time- and task-constraints, is a critical component in 
many dynamic real-world activities and cognitive tasks, particularly in elite sporting 
performance. Attention Control Theory was developed, from Processing Efficiency Theory, 
to further explore the relationship between anxiety and its effects on performance and has 
specifically investigated perceptual anticipation skill. Attentional Control Theory holds that 
the three functions listed above are the main functions of the central executive. Accordingly, 
Attentional Control Theory holds that anxiety impairs attentional control; therefore, anxiety 
has adverse effects on the central executive (inhibition, shifting and updating functions) due 
to their involving attentional control. This study would attempt to explore this relationship in 
a more conclusive and encapsulating manner by investigating all three functions of the 
central executive together, while also testing perceptual anticipation in a tennis-based dual 
task paradigm. Multiple hypotheses were established for the following study and multiple 
measures were examined to examine any significant effects in attentional control and 
perceptual anticipation skill in low and high anxiety groups. It was predicted that anxiety 
would impair all functions of the central executive and perceptual anticipation skill. The 
results from this study offer partial support for the assumptions of Attentional Control 
Theory. 
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Introduction 
The role of attentional control in sport performance has been widely researched in sport 
performance, particularly with regards to perceptual anticipation skill, however it has not 
been examined to its full capacity. Skilled perceptual anticipation, the capability of 
anticipating the actions of others and processing information under severe time- and task-
constraints, is a critical component in many dynamic real-world activities and cognitive tasks, 
particularly in elite sporting performance (Rowe and McKenna, 2001; Vickers and Lewinski, 
2012; Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams, 2016). Sporting events can instigate increased 
levels of anxiety due to their capacity to pose as potentially threatening evaluative situations 
(Englert and Bertrams, 2012). Consequently, the execution of cognitive tasks are often 
hindered, leading to decrements in an individual’s performance levels (Nibbeling, Daanen, 
Gerritsma, Hofland and Oudejans, 2012). Accordingly, the influence that anxiety exerts on an 
individual’s sporting performance, has been one of the most fundamentally studied 
phenomena in social and sport psychology (Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams, 2016). 
 
To gain a better understanding of how certain cognitive actions are hindered, the entity that is 
anxiety must be defined along with the theories that offer a detailed explanation as to how 
anxiety impairs performance. Anxiety is a multidimensional entity, recognised as an aversive 
emotional and motivational state that occurs in situations where levels of perceived threat are 
high (Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). State anxiety (the current level of anxiety experienced 
at a given point) is interactively reliant on the trait anxiety-situational stress relationship 
(Eysenck, 1992; Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). It is habitually perceived as a state in which 
an individual is unable to prompt a clear behavioural response to eliminate or modify an 
event, object or interpretation that poses as a direct threat to a current goal (Power and 
Dalgleish, 1997). Individuals who exhibit high levels of anxiety often worry about this threat 
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to a current goal, and therefore will employ a strategy to lower their levels of anxiety in an 
attempt to achieve that goal (Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). Consequently, anxiety is often 
associated with adverse effects on the performance of cognitive tasks (see Eysenck, 1992). 
 
The following segment of this paper will focus on the theoretical predictions of anxiety on 
cognitive tasks, particularly those placing significant demands on cognitive resources. There 
are several theories that have been proposed over the last 20 years toward explaining this 
process, though only two are of importance to this paper: Processing Efficiency Theory (PET; 
Eysenck and Calvo, 1992) and the more recent, yet major extension of Processing Efficiency 
Theory, Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). 
These theories will be explored, specifically in the domain of sport, as competitive sport 
offers a dynamic environment in which to test the applications of both PET and ACT, where 
rapid decisions are required, with concurrently high demands on perception, action and 
cognition (Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams, 2016). Finally, the evidence relating to 
ACT’s major hypotheses will be evaluated prior to the declaration of this study’s own 
hypotheses. 
 
Processing Efficiency Theory (PET) 
Before exploring ACT, PET must be explored to identify the foundations that led to the 
development of Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo’s new theory. PET, developed by 
Eysenck and Calvo (1992), offered the earliest explanation towards depicting anxiety as an 
aversive emotional state occurring as a result of threat, consequently diverting an individual’s 
attention toward distracting or irrelevant stimuli. The fundamental distinction in PET is 
between performance effectiveness and processing efficiency (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos 
and Calvo, 2007). Derakshan and Eysenck (2009) define performance effectiveness as the 
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quality of task performance (generally, response accuracy of performance), whereas 
processing efficiency is defined as the relationship between the performance effectiveness 
and the effort or resources spent in task performance. It is habitually observed that processing 
efficiency decreases as more resources are invested to attain a given performance level 
(Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). Furthermore, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo (2007) 
predict negative effects of anxiety to have a significantly greater impact on processing 
efficiency compared to performance effectiveness. 
 
Assumptions 
PET is built upon two major assumptions. The first assumption is that worry is the underlying 
component of state anxiety responsible for the effects of anxiety impairing performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). 
Worrisome thoughts use up attentional resources necessary for cognitive task demands, 
leaving fewer resources available for concurrent task processing (Derakshan and Eysenck, 
2009). However, “… a critical assumption is that task-irrelevant processing does not 
necessarily have adverse effects on performance effectiveness” (Derakshan and Eysenck, 
2009, pp. 169). Therefore, worrisome thoughts are assumed to enhance motivation in 
individuals high in anxiety to minimise the adverse effects of anxiety. Consequently, anxious 
individuals will enhance their efforts in an attempt to compensate for the adverse effects of 
anxiety on processing efficiency by utilising additional auxiliary processing resources 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). If these auxiliary processing resources are 
available, anxiety will typically impair processing efficiency more so than performance 
effectiveness, however if these resources are unavailable, then performance effectiveness will 
be impaired (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). 
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The second assumption of PET concerns the adverse effects of anxiety on the mechanisms 
and components of working memory. PET is primarily based on Baddeley’s Tripartite 
Working Memory Model (1986), which has since expanded into a four-component model 
(see Baddeley, 2001). The original model dictates that the limited-capacity working memory 
system consists of three components: a) a modality-free central executive involved in 
information processing that comprises self-regulatory functions (e.g. performance 
monitoring, planning, and strategy selection); b) a phonological loop for the rehearsal and 
transient storage of verbal information; and c) a visuospatial sketchpad for the processing and 
transient storage of visual and spatial information. The latter two are also known as ‘slave 
systems (Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). 
 
It is assumed that the main effects of worry (more generally of anxiety) are predominantly on 
the central executive (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Consequently, adverse 
effects of anxiety on performance effectiveness and processing efficiency should be greater 
on tasks imposing substantial demands on the processing and storage capacity of working 
memory (particularly the central executive). The central executive is primarily affected, yet 
there is a small adverse effect on the functioning of the phonological loop. Consequently, 
anxious individuals should exhibit impaired performance in dual task situations, where the 
simultaneous demands of the two tasks on the central executive are high (Derakshan and 
Eysenck, 2009). 
 
There is a wide array of literature that supports these assumptions (for a review, see Eysenck 
et al., 2007). Eysenck, Payne and Derakshan (2005) reported relatively direct evidence in 
their study, in which high and low trait anxious individuals performed a primary complex 
visuospatial task while simultaneously performing a secondary task that involved the central 
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executive, the visuospatial sketchpad, or the phonological loop. When individuals performed 
the primary visuospatial task alongside a secondary task that demanded the use of the central 
executive, the high anxious group performed significantly worse than the low anxious group. 
It is important to note that Eysenck, Payne and Derakshan (2005) observed significant 
adverse effects of anxiety on performance only when the secondary task demanded the 
central executive. Consequently, anxiety impaired performance on both the primary and 
secondary tasks under this condition, meaning that the adverse effects of anxiety on primary 
task performance when compared to the secondary task involving the central executive 
cannot be accredited to strategic changes (due to anxiety) in which primary task priorities are 
reduced. Thus, the overall pattern of their findings suggests that anxiety reduces the central 
executive’s available capacity; however, the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad 
are marginally affected. 
 
Rapee (1993) reported earlier relevant evidence when exploring the effects of several tasks 
that varied in their demands on the central executive on worry-related thoughts. Rapee used 
random letter generation as a task, due to its ability to overload the central executive and use 
up attentional resources. The random letter generation task reduced worry-related thoughts. 
These results are consistent with PET, in that worry-related thoughts and the random letter 
generation task competed for use of the limited-capacity central executive resources. 
Additionally, tasks requiring minimal central executive involvement (word repetition; fixed-
or-finder- key presses) failed to reduce worry-related thoughts. 
 
Theoretical Limitations 
While PET provides an early framework for explaining how anxiety impairs attentional 
control, processing efficiency and performance effectiveness, some of the theoretical 
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assumptions it offers come with little explanatory power and/or precision, causing the scope 
of this theory to be questionable. These theoretical assumptions of PET concern the effects of 
distracting stimuli on anxious individuals (see Calvo and Eysenck, 1996), threat-related 
stimuli adversely affecting anxious and nonanxious individuals’ performance rather than 
neutral stimuli (see Eysenck and Byrne, 1992), and anxious individuals outperforming 
nonanxious individuals (see Byrne and Eysenck, 1995). However, the fundamental 
theoretical assumption that creates the most concern is that anxiety impairs the efficiency of 
the central executive. This assumption is relatively imprecise. The central executive fulfils 
several functions that include switching attention between tasks, inhibition and selective 
attention (i.e. focusing attention on relevant information and processes whilst attempting to 
inhibit irrelevant ones), updating and checking the contents of the working memory, and 
coding representations in working memory for time and place of appearance (see Smith and 
Jonides, 1999). What PET fails to specify is if some or all of these functions are affected 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Thus, Derakshan and Eysenck (2009) 
deemed it necessary to extend and develop this theory further. 
 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT) 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo’s (2007) developed ACT as a major development of 
PET to build on its strengths and to address its limitations. It provides a solid framework in 
explaining the effects of anxiety on attention and cognitive task performance in a more 
systematic manner. The development of ACT has had many influences from ideas put 
forward (e.g. Fox, Russo and Dutton, 2002; Derryberry and Reed, 2002). These influences 
have strongly supported the most general assumption within ACT: that the effects of anxiety 
on attentional processes are of fundamental importance to an understanding of how anxiety 
adversely affects performance (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Power and 
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Dalgleish (1997) assumed that an individual experiences anxiety when a current goal is under 
threat, a general assumption consistent with plentiful empirical evidence. This threat to a 
current goal causes attention to be allocated to detecting the source of the threat and then 
deciding on the most appropriate response. ACT holds the assumption that attention allocated 
to threat-related stimuli is increased through the effects of anxiety, depicting that anxiety 
typically reduces attentional focus on a current task (unless it involves threat-related stimuli; 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). More specifically, anxiety impairs attentional 
control, a fundamental function of the central executive. Anxious individuals are thought to 
favourably allocate attentional resources to threat-related stimuli whether internal (e.g. 
worrisome thoughts) or external (threat-related stimuli). 
 
Elevated levels of worry are often associated with decreased performance levels, though there 
are several studies in which high anxious individuals reported significantly more worry than 
low anxious individuals yet have performed at the same level as the low anxious individuals 
(e.g. Calvo and Ramos, 1989; Calvo, Alamo and Ramos, 1990). According to ACT, this 
pattern occurs due to worry impairing processing efficiency more so than performance 
effectiveness (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). The only argument about this 
revelation is that worry is seldom manipulated explicitly yet is often only retrospectively 
assessed and the relationship between worry and attention has not been investigated 
systematically. 
 
A further assumption that ACT holds is that attentional control is impaired by anxiety when 
threat-related, task-irrelevant stimuli are not present (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 
2007). If an individual perceives him- or herself to be under threat and subsequently 
experiences anxiety, it is potentially dangerous to maintain very high attentional control to a 
8 
 
specific stimulus. The optimal strategy would be to allocate attentional resources widely, 
thereby reducing attentional control with respect to an ongoing task (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos and Calvo, 2007). 
 
Like PET, ACT portrays a major distinction between processing efficiency and performance 
effectiveness, yet the central point of this new theory predicts anxiety to affect the 
performance of cognitive tasks via its adverse effects on attentional control, one of the central 
executive’s major functions. It is important to understand the term ‘attentional control’ due to 
its numerous definitions. In their recent journal in which they reported new developments in 
ACT, Derakshan and Eysenck (2009) adopted Yantis’s (1998) definition, in which there is a 
fundamental distinction between top-down goal-driven processes and bottom-up stimulus-
driven processes. 
 
Moving forward from Yantis’s definition of attentional control, Corbetta and Shulman (2002) 
proclaimed that there are two attentional systems: the top-down goal-driven system 
(influenced by an individual’s current goals, knowledge, and expectations) and the stimulus-
driven system, which is influenced by salient stimuli (adopted from Yantis’s definition). The 
top-down goal-driven system, centred in the prefrontal cortex, is involved in the top-down 
regulation of attention and closely resembles the cognitive control system proposed by Miller 
and Cohen (2001). The stimulus-driven system, which closely resembles the posterior 
attentional system proposed by Posner and Petersen (1990), comprises the temporo-parietal 
and ventral frontal cortex. As stated by Corbetta and Shulman (2002), the stimulus-driven 
system is recruited when ‘behaviourally relevant sensory events’ are detected, particularly 
when these events are salient. Both of these systems are assumed to interact with one another 
regularly (see Pashler, Johnston and Ruthruff, 2001, for a review). 
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ACT posits that anxiety disrupts the balance between these two attentional systems by 
enhancing the influence of stimulus driven bottom-up processes over the efficient top-down 
goal-driven processes (Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). This involves bidirectional influences 
of each system on the other, for example, there is a reduced influence of the top-down goal-
driven attentional system when anxiety affects the stimulus-driven attentional system through 
the automatic processing of threat-related stimuli (see Fox, Russo and Georgiou, 2005 for a 
review). Additionally, a reduced influence of goal direction on attentional processes dictates 
that such processes are significantly more affected by salient stimuli (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos and Calvo, 2007). All of these effects of anxiety should be significantly greater when 
anxiety levels are remarkably high (e.g. under stressful conditions). 
 
Accordingly, there is plentiful evidence demonstrating that anxiety is associated with an 
attentional bias for threat-related information as well as an enhanced distractibility in the 
presence of task-irrelevant, particularly threatening information. Additionally, there is a 
strong association with a failure to disengage from the processing of threat-related 
information (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg and Van Ijzendoorn, 
2007). The assumption that anxiety increases attention to task-irrelevant stimuli, particularly 
threat-related) is a strong indicator that attentional focus on concurrent task demands is 
typically reduced by the detrimental effects of anxiety (Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). Put 
simply, anxiety affects attentional control, a key function of the central executive. 
 
Functions of the Central Executive 
While anxiety affects attentional control, a fundamental function of the central executive 
component of the working memory, there was originally no consensus regarding the number 
and nature of functions of the central executive that are adversely affected (Derakshan and 
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Eysenck, 2009). The approach adopted by Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter 
and Wager (2000) and Friedman and Miyake (2004) used latent-variable analysis (using 
many tasks generally regarded as using the central executive) to identify the basic control 
functions of the central executive. They identified three functions: inhibition, shifting and 
updating. Firstly, the inhibition function (also known as negative attentional control) involves 
the use of attentional control to resist disruption or interference from task-irrelevant stimuli 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Secondly, the shifting function (also known 
as positive attentional control) involves the use of attentional control to shift attention 
flexibly between tasks in an attempt to ensure that it remains focused on task-relevant stimuli. 
Lastly, the updating function involves the “… updating and monitoring of working memory 
representations” (Miyake et al., 2000, pp. 56). This function is primarily involved with the 
transient storage of information, though it involves short-term memory rather than attentional 
control. Derakshan and Eysenck (2009) regard it as a measure of basic attentional or short-
term capacity. 
 
ACT holds that the three functions listed above are the main functions of the central 
executive (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Accordingly, ACT holds that 
anxiety impairs attentional control; therefore, anxiety has adverse effects on these functions 
due to their involving attentional control. The updating function is not directly affected by 
anxiety as it involves short-term memory more than attention. However, the other two 
functions are both directly involved with attentional control: inhibition uses attentional 
control to restrain attention from being directed to task-irrelevant stimuli, while shifting uses 
attentional control in a positive way to respond optimally to changing task demands 
(Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). Thus, the most noteworthy assumption of ACT is that 
anxiety impairs the efficiency of the inhibition and shifting functions. It is worth noting that 
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the brain areas most associated with the inhibition and shifting functions of the central 
executive are similar to those associated with Miller and Cohen’s goal-directed attentional 
system (2001). 
 
To summarise, the inhibition, shifting and updating functions are partially separable, though 
they are also partially interdependent in their functioning. This suggests that they all rely to 
some extent on the resources of the central executive or top-down goal-driven system; 
therefore, demands on any one function may reduce the processing resources of the central 
executive available for the other functions (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). 
 
Wilson (2008) has demonstrated that both PET and ACT are applicable to sporting 
performance. Individuals use the same attentional systems regardless of task or situation, 
however there are numerous fundamental differences between the research literature on the 
effects of anxiety on cognitive processing and performance and that on the effects of pressure 
on sporting performance (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). These differences must be addressed 
before moving towards Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS). 
 
There are two major factors that are much more apparent in sport performance research as 
compared to cognitive performance research (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). The first factor is 
a major emphasis on the effects of pressure (high vs low) on performance. This is 
fundamental because individual’s anxiety and motivational levels are strongly influenced by 
pressure. The second factor is that sport performance research often compares that of experts 
and novices. This is fundamental because experts have developed ‘automatic’ response 
patterns and behaviours of reducing anxiety under pressure (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). 
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Effects of Pressure 
In sport research, it is habitually assumed that performers’ anxiety will be greater in high-
pressure situations compared to low-pressure ones (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). Thus, a 
theory of sport performance needs to consider factors within individual sportspersons 
determining the extent to which high pressure situations create anxiety. In contrast, the 
emphasis in research on cognitive performance has been on between-participants’ differences 
in trait anxiety levels (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). 
 
Sport performance success and failure are frequently more apparent and important in high 
pressure, competitive sport situations as compared to cognitive tasks (Groome and Eysenck, 
2016). In many sport situations, failure is immediately recognisable (e.g. a dart misses the 
winning double; a short putt is missed;). Additionally, sport performance failure can have 
fundamental importance (e.g. thwarting a professional sportspersons’ lifelong ambition). 
Thus, an emphasis on reactions to success and failure is of greater importance to a sport 
performance theory as compared to a cognitive performance theory (Groome and Eysenck, 
2016). 
 
Manipulating situational pressure in sport performance research has direct implications for 
motivation on the plausible assumption that high pressure situations typically produce greater 
motivation in sportspersons than low pressure situations. However, ACT typically considers 
indirect effects of motivation (e.g. poor sporting performance habitually leads to minimal 
effort). 
 
Expert vs Novice Performance 
The emphasis in sport performance research on comparing experts and novices has various 
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implications (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). Experts typically possess various motor skills that 
can be performed on demand. Consequently, expert sporting performance is often affected 
much less than that of novices by manipulations targeted at reducing the available resources 
of the central executive. Additionally, many experts have devoted thousands of hours to 
developing their motor skills for their respective sports (Baker and Young, 2014). Such 
prolonged practice (and competition experience) characteristically translates to finely 
developed cognitive processes and strategies, specifically designed to facilitate optimal sport 
performance levels. Groome and Eysenck (2016) expect the effects of heightened anxiety on 
these individuals to be considerably different from what typical participants experience in 
mainstream anxiety research (i.e. individuals high in trait anxiety). 
 
Attentional Control Theory: Sport (ACTS) 
There are two central issues that must be addressed with any adequate theory of pressure and 
sport performance (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). Firstly, there is the issue of how pressure 
influences the individual’s levels of anxiety and motivation. Second is the issue of how those 
levels of anxiety and motivation influence performance. Typically, ACT focuses primarily on 
the latter issue, whereas ACTS focuses equally on both issues. 
 
There are three key theoretical assumptions of ACT (mentioned above) that relate to the 
effects of anxiety on performance and are directly applicable to ACTS (Groome and Eysenck, 
2016). It is assumed that anxiety impairs processing efficiency more than performance 
effectiveness, that anxiety reduces the efficiency of the inhibition function, and the efficiency 
of the shifting function also. 
ACT and ACTS emphasise the important role that attentional control holds in outstanding 
performance (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). Typically, experts should have more efficient 
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attentional control as compared to novices (of a specific sport). For example, Gegenfurtner, 
Lehtinen and Säljö (2011) compared eye movements of experts and novices in several 
domains (medicine, transportation and specifically sport). They found that in all domains, 
experts had faster first fixations on task-relevant information and fewer fixations on task-
irrelevant visual areas, suggesting that experts displayed more efficient attentional control as 
compared to novices. 
 
Processing Efficiency vs Performance Effectiveness 
According to ACTS, adverse effects of competitive pressure will be habitually be greater on 
processing efficiency as compared to performance effectiveness (Groome and Eysenck, 
2016). In sport performance research, processing efficiency has sporadically been assessed by 
relating performance effectiveness to self-reported effort. Canal-Bruland, Pijpers and 
Oudejans (2010) previously examined novice dart players throwing darts as a target under 
both low and high anxiety conditions. There were no adverse effects from anxiety on 
performance accuracy, however participants reported much greater mental effort under high 
anxiety conditions. These findings support the notion that anxiety impairs processing 
efficiency more so than performance effectiveness. Self-report measures are simple to use, 
though they can provide distorted evidence (Groome and Eysenck, 2016). Thus, it is 
important to examine other factors and measures such as movement kinematics and muscular 
activity in future studies. 
 
ACTS represents an extension of ACT, making it more directly relevant to sport performance 
under pressure. These theories overlap substantially in their accounts of the adverse effects of 
anxiety on performance. The key distinction is that ACTS focuses much more on the factors 
jointly determining an individual’s anxiety level in pressured situations as compared to ACT. 
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Though not a fully developed theory, there is a high recommendation to test the theory more 
thoroughly (for a full review, see Groome and Eysenck, 2016). 
 
Attentional Control Theory Research 
Circling back to ACT (some relevance to ACTS), the following section will explore previous 
research that has been devoted to the three functions of the attentional control. 
 
Inhibition Function 
As mentioned above, Friedman and Miyake (2004) extended the scope of the inhibition 
function using latent-variable analysis. They found that inhibition resists distracting 
interference in addition to inhibiting pre-potent responses, suggesting that this function is 
directly involved in maintaining task goals when confronted with environmental task-
irrelevant stimuli. This function is identified as a general one involving executive control 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Other approaches have identified several 
different inhibition processes. Nigg (2000) identified four types of effortful inhibition: 
cognitive inhibition (suppression of irrelevant information from working memory); 
behavioural inhibition (suppression of pre-potent responses); oculomotor inhibition 
(suppression of reflexive saccades); and interference control (interference due to resource or 
stimulus competition). While these inhibition processes may be theoretically separate, 
Miyake et al. (2000) and Friedman and Miyake (2004) identified that interference control, 
behavioural inhibition and oculomotor inhibition appear to involve the same underlying 
inhibition function. This evidence postulates that the inhibition involves attentional control in 
a restrictive manner, preventing attentional resources from being allocated to task-irrelevant 
stimuli. This is of direct relevance to ACT, though it remains to be determined whether the 
same inhibition function is involved in other forms of inhibition. 
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Inhibition has been a thoroughly researched function of ACT (for a review of previous 
research, see Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007), with more studies seeking to 
investigate the capability of this function in the domain of sport. In a recent study looking at 
the effects of anxiety on anticipation and visual search in dynamic, time-constrained 
situations, Vater, Roca and Williams (2016) expected the inhibition function would be unable 
to strongly inhibit task-irrelevant stimuli. Their experiment involved a visual search task 
where high- and low-skilled football players viewed football situations under near vs. far 
situation constraints and were tested under high- and low-anxiety conditions. They found the 
inhibition of worrying thoughts was reduced in the high-anxiety condition, which led to less 
efficient visual search behaviours during dynamic temporal-constrained situations. This 
resulted in participants generating longer response times and greater mental effort to 
complete the task. Accordingly, Vater, Roca and Williams provide substantial support for 
ACT, demonstrating that anxiety impairs processing efficiency and the possibility that top-
down attentional control is impaired across different task constraints too. 
 
Causer, Holmes, Smith and Williams (2011) had earlier investigated the predictions of ACT 
within a perceptual-motor context where elite shotgun shooters were tested under practice 
and competition conditions. They examined the effects of anxiety on attentional control and 
the subsequent influence on processing efficiency and performance effectiveness, predicting 
the adverse effects of anxiety to have a detrimental effect on performance effectiveness. They 
tested shotgun shooters in a field setting under both low and high anxiety conditions, where 
they observed significantly greater mental effort ratings in the elevated anxiety condition. 
Performance effectiveness, as well as processing efficiency in the high anxiety condition, 
declined while also demonstrating the aversive effects of anxiety on performance increases 
when the task demands on the central executive are increased. Overall, their findings 
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demonstrate significant evidence that participants were unable to maintain performance 
effectiveness when task demands become greater, thus rendering the inhibition (and shifting) 
function redundant. 
 
Shifting Function 
The shifting function of ACT uses attentional control in a ‘positive’ way to shift the 
allocation of attention in order to focus on task-relevant stimuli (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos 
and Calvo, 2007). Unlike the work of Miyake et al. (2000), and Friedman and Miyake 
(2004), Wager, Jonides and Reading (2004) identified in a meta-analysis that the same seven 
distinct brain areas were constantly stimulated across a range of diverse shifting tasks, 
suggesting there is a ‘single’ important shifting function. 
 
Dual Task Paradigms 
When testing ACT (and PET) and specifically the shifting function, researchers have 
commonly employed procedures that involve abstract secondary tasks or non-task-relevant 
stimuli in order to load the working memory and test the shifting (and inhibition) function 
(Runswick, Roca, Williams, Bezodis and North, 2018). Studies investigating the shifting 
function have predominantly used these types of ‘dual task’ paradigms as a vehicle to 
measure performance. This paradigm involves concurrently performing two tasks with 
performance of one or both tasks being impaired (Karatekin, Couperus and Marcus, 2004). 
 
There are two major approaches to the study of impairment effects in the dual task paradigm. 
The first approach emphasises structural and processing bottlenecks, or processing stages that 
cannot be applied to carrying out two tasks concurrently (Pashler and Johnson, 1998). The 
second approach emphasises functional limitations. Studies taking this perspective often posit 
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a hypothetical and finite entity that confines how much information an individual can process 
at a given point in time (Karatekin, Couperus and Marcus, 2004). 
 
The latter approach had led to two lines of investigation. The first concerned characterising 
the architecture of resources i.e. the total amount of resources an individual has and whether 
they come from a single, undifferentiated pool or from multiple pools (Karatekin, Couperus 
and Marcus, 2004). The second line of research concerns how resources are allocated as an 
individual pays attention. The total amount of resources is not as fundamental as how an 
individual allocates those resources among tasks on a moment-to-moment basis depending on 
task instructions and that individual’s needs and priorities (Karatekin, Couperus and Marcus, 
2004). Rather than viewing attention as a ‘resource’, researchers see attention as a ‘skill’ 
(Hirst and Kalmar, 1987) and emphasise the top-down active, and flexible nature of 
attentional control (e.g. Meyer and Kieras, 1997). 
 
Runswick, Roca, Williams, Bezodis and North (2018) conclude that though it is important to 
represent perceptual information in an accurate manner, it is also fundamental to ensure that 
cognitive load and working memory are targeted using representative context-specific 
manipulations as compared to using abstract secondary tasks in order to investigate how this 
affects perceptual-motor performance and interactions with anxiety. Studies that utilise dual 
task paradigms as a means of measuring a certain entity, using a combination of behavioural, 
psychophysiological, and neuroimaging methods, can have practical implications in 
understanding how an individual learns to divide attention efficiently across multiple tasks 
and how this ability may break down in pathological conditions (Karatekin, Couperus and 
Marcus, 2004). 
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Derakshan, Smyth and Eysenck (2009) performed a dual task paradigm based study in which 
low and high anxious participants performed arithmetical tasks under dual task or single task 
conditions. Relative to the shifting function, they predicted that demands on attentional 
control would be greater in the dual task condition compared to the single task condition. 
Their most significant finding was that task switching had a non-significant effect on low 
anxiety participants, however had a significantly detrimental effect on the performance of 
high anxiety participants, supporting the predictions of ACT. They found that the major 
difference between the dual task and single task conditions was the demands on the shifting 
function. Additionally, they found the significant interaction between anxiety, task type, and 
complexity of the task specified more closely the adverse effects on anxiety on dual tasks. 
More so, this three-way interaction indicated that these adverse effects of anxiety on dual task 
performance centred on tasks of high complexity. In conclusion, they stated that high anxiety 
participants may have found it more difficult to exert positive attentional control with high 
complexity tasks compared to low complexity tasks. 
 
Derakshan, Smyth and Eysenck’s (2009) dual task study has prompted the exploration of 
more dual task studies into the effects of anxiety on performance. Nibbeling, Oudejans and 
Daanen (2012) explored the combined effects of anxiety, cognitive load, and expertise on 
darts performance and gaze behaviour in a far aiming task. The study involved expert and 
novice darts player performing a simple dart throwing task under both low and high anxiety 
conditions, in a single task and dual task paradigm. Derakshan, Smyth and Eysenck 
manipulated anxiety by performing the dart throwing task on a climbing wall, with and 
without performing the secondary task. The secondary task consisted of participants counting 
backwards from a random number between 500-1000 in multiples of three. While principally 
measuring participants average dart scores, times, and their gaze behaviour, their cognitive 
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efforts were measured using this secondary task. They found that anxiety induced a minor, 
yet significant decrease in dart throwing performance only in novices. Both novices and 
experts demonstrated increases in dart times and mental effort, and decreases in response rate 
in the secondary task, illustrating a detrimental effect on processing efficiency with the 
presence of anxiety. The anxiety-induced decrease in performance for novices was of 
fundamental importance, as it was accompanied by final fixations on the target which were 
significantly shorter and deviated off the target earlier. However, the dual task did not affect 
performance in any manner. Their findings provide substantial support in the area of far 
aiming tasks, demonstrating that anxiety affects not only processing efficiency, but 
sometimes performance effectiveness also. Furthermore, their findings offer support for ACT 
as a suitable framework for explaining the effects of anxiety and cognitive secondary tasks. 
  
Updating Function 
The third function of the central executive identified by Miyake et al. (2000) is updating, the 
ability to update and monitor working memory representations. While this function typically 
involves updating, monitoring is another important aspect of this function. This function “… 
involves the transient storage of information rather than being directly concerned with 
attentional control” (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007, pp. 339), thus the effects 
of anxiety are greater on inhibition and shifting compared to updating. 
 
Compared to the two former functions, studies observing the updating function in a sport 
setting are scarce, with more of a direct approach to testing this function in social- and 
neuropsychology (for example, Proios, Asaridou and Brugger, 2008). In terms of testing this 
function, studies have primarily used cognitive tasks that overload the central executive, e.g. 
random generation tasks. Random generation requires an individual to “… produce a random 
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sequence of items which have strong, overlearned associations, such as numbers” and “… 
letters of the alphabet” (Proios, Asaridou and Brugger, 2008, pp. 158). Commonly, many of 
the studies that have used random number generation tasks have used a tool called RGCalc 
(Towse and Neil, 1998). This software programme is unique in that many different indices 
are produced that correspond to the analysis of randomness. 
 
One such example is a study performed by Audiffren, Tomporowski and Zagrodnik (2008). 
While not anxiety-related, they investigated the immediate and short-term effects of aerobic 
exercise on young adults’ executive functions and processing. Participants performed a 
random number generation task that measured two aspects of executive function, before, 
during and after aerobic exercise. In this task, participants were instructed to say aloud a 
random number between 1 and 9, one hundred times. Participants performed the same task on 
the ergometer whilst not pedalling too. Audiffren, Tomporowski and Zagrodnik (2008) found 
that aerobic exercise has a selective influence on random number generation indices related 
to the ability to alternate ascending and descending runs throughout the entire exercise bout. 
They also found that aerobic exercise induced a shift to less effortful number generation 
strategy, however it has no significant influence on random number generation performance 
when exercise has ceased. This could be due to the primary task requiring only mechanical 
work, rather than demanding attentional resources. 
 
Perceptual Anticipation and Anxiety Research 
While the literature above provides an insight into the investigations on the functions of 
attentional control, this following section will provide examples of anxiety affecting 
attentional control and anticipation, specifically in the realm of racket sports. In an early 
study by Rowe and McKenna (2001), they investigated attentional demands and skilled 
22 
 
anticipation in the domain of tennis. In the third of their three experiments, they addressed 
whether the anticipation skills measured in their first two experiments became more 
automatic as tennis experience was acquired. They assessed expert and novices using a 
secondary/dual task on tennis video test performance that was uniquely attention-demanding. 
They used random letter generation as the secondary task, due to its ability to disrupt 
performance in a variety of tasks and specifically uses up attentional resources. Participants 
were instructed to generate a random stream of letters at the rate of approximately two per 
second, however were instructed to avoid certain abbreviations (e.g. BBC, KFC). They 
predicted that video testing performance in novices would be more vulnerable to dual task 
decrement compared to experts. Their results supported their hypothesis, however they found 
that the total number of letters generated during video test performance had a negative 
correlation with dual task decrement. 
 
While Rowe and McKenna (2001) have provided an initial introduction into the realm of 
anticipation in a sport setting, there have been studies that have since investigated the 
aversive effects of anxiety on an individuals’ ability to perceptually anticipate, along with 
testing the assumptions of ACT, in racket sports. Recently, Alder, Ford, Causer and Williams 
(2016) examined the effects of low versus high anxiety training on anticipation judgements in 
elite badminton players. They observed the effects of low- versus high-anxiety conditions of 
anticipation judgements in international level badminton players. Players would face serves 
during video-based training (low anxiety) and then transfer to field-based conditions (high 
anxiety). Players were allocated to either a low anxiety training, high anxiety training, or 
control group in a pre-training-post-test design. Alder, Ford, Causer and Williams found that 
response accuracy and final fixations were both lower and shorter, respectively, in the high 
anxiety pre-test compared to the low anxiety pre-test. Both low and high anxiety players 
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demonstrated greater accuracy of judgements and longer final fixations in the low anxiety 
post-test as compared to the pre-test and control group. In the high anxiety post-test, high 
anxiety players maintained accuracy when compared with the low anxiety post-test, however 
low anxiety players demonstrated lower accuracy. With relevance to ACT, Alder, Ford, 
Causer and Williams’ findings offer valuable support for the theory and previous research, 
demonstrating that high levels of anxiety result in reduced processing efficiency as evidenced 
by the overall increased effort in maintaining performance outcome. 
 
Another recent study was performed by Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams (2016). They 
tested the assumptions of ACT by examining the aversive effects of anxiety on anticipation in 
a time-constrained task. Additionally, the examined the level of involvement of cognitive 
processes in anticipation and how they interact with anxiety. In their experiment, skilled and 
less-skilled tennis players anticipated the shots of opponents under both low and high anxiety 
conditions. This involved viewing three types of video stimuli, each one depicting a different 
level of contextual information, while they measured performance effectiveness (response 
accuracy) and processing efficiency (response accuracy divided by corresponding mental 
effort). Higher levels of processing efficiency were observed in skilled players as compared 
to their less-skilled counterparts. Processing efficiency significantly decreased under high 
anxiety conditions as compared to the low anxiety conditions, however there was no observed 
difference in performance effectiveness. Cocks, Jackson Bishop and Williams found that 
anxiety was most detrimental to performance in the condition that only conveyed contextual 
information, suggesting that anxiety may have a greater influence on high level (top-down) 
cognitive processes. This may have been due to a shift in attentional control. Their findings 
have provided limited support for ACT, demonstrating that anxiety induced greater 
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decrements in processing efficiency compared to performance effectiveness. This was likely 
due to predominance of the stimulus-driven attentional system. 
 
Runswick, Roca, Williams, Bezodis and North (2018) examined the effects of anxiety and 
situation-specific contextual information on attentional, behavioural, and interpretational 
processes supporting perceptual motor performance as propositioned by Nieuwenhuys and 
Oudejans (2012). They used an in situ task in which twelve skilled cricket batters played 
against a skilled spin bowler. Conditions were manipulated so as to induce low and high 
anxiety levels and influence the presence of low and high levels of situation-specific context. 
They found that the number of good bat-ball contacts decreased under high anxiety levels, 
while the number of times the ball was missed increased under high levels of situation-
specific context. They also found that under high anxiety levels, participants devoted 
significantly greater fixations of shorter duration to more locations, however the adverse 
effects of anxiety were restricted to the attentional level only. Additionally, situation-specific 
context was only found to adversely affect performance and behavioural measures. Anxiety, 
cognitive load and perceptual cognitive processes were not affected. Their findings suggest 
that through different mechanisms from anxiety (independent of working memory load), 
sporting and/or cognitive performance is influenced. 
 
Runswick, Roca, Williams, McRobert and North (2018) examined the temporal integration of 
visual and contextual information during skilled anticipation in skilled and less-skilled cricket 
batters. The participants had to anticipate ball deliveries from bowlers in a video-based 
simulation task, in which the footage of each bowl was occluded at ‘four-time’ points relative 
to ball release (pre-run, mid-run, pre-release and post-release). Participants were instructed to 
rate the importance of different sources of information when making their judgements at each 
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occlusion point. They found that skilled batters had significantly greater anticipation skill, 
anticipating more accurately at all occlusion points as compared to the less-skilled batters. 
Additionally, the expert batters considered the use of both contextual and visual information 
to be of greater importance when anticipating as compared to the novice batters. Contextual 
information was used throughout the action (mostly by the expert batters) as compared to 
kinematic cues which were only deemed key to anticipation in the final moments of bowling 
sequences (i.e. immediately prior to ball release). Their findings offered further 
understanding into the processes underpinning skilled anticipation and unearthed protocols 
for designing training programmes to improve skilled anticipation. 
 
Relating back to tennis, Murphy, Jackson and Williams (2018) performed two experiments in 
which skilled and less-skilled tennis players were presented with animations of rallies from 
real matches. These animations omitted access to specific postural information from the 
opponent, compelling participants to perceptually anticipate based solely on contextual 
information. In their first experiment, participants were instructed to anticipate the outcome 
of an opponent’s shot under three conditions in which the sequence length (i.e. number of 
shots in the rally) preceding the same occluded shot was varied. Participants had to 
successfully anticipate the direction of the shot more accurately when the preceding shot 
sequence was presented than not. In their second experiment, animations that depicted the 
ball, the players, or both, in dynamic or stationary form, were presented to participants. They 
found the lowest response accuracy scores were evident in conditions in which only the ball 
was depicted. Their findings suggest that information from the player and ball motion is 
essential to provide the context under which skilled performers are able to consciously pick 
up information and utilise that information to perceptually anticipate more accurately than 
their less-skilled counterparts. 
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Aims and Hypotheses 
There has been a clear drive towards exploring the effects of anxiety on perceptual 
anticipation and attentional control in competitive sport and sport and exercise science, 
specifically examining the inhibition and shifting functions. However, there is a lack of 
research on the updating function (specifically in the domain of tennis with the exception of 
Rowe and McKenna, 2001) and no knowledge of any previous studies that have investigated 
all three functions together in the same experiment in a sport setting. Therefore, this study 
attempted to further explore attentional control by examining all three functions of the central 
executive together as well as perceptual anticipation. For these reasons, this study adopted the 
third experiment performed by Rowe and McKenna (2001) listed above in which a tennis-
related primary task was performed concurrently with a random response generation task. 
Again, dual task paradigms have offered significant support in impairing attentional control 
and perceptual anticipation among other entities/abilities. 
 
Multiple hypotheses were established for the following study in a set order that would be 
straightforward to follow in the method (measures), results and discussion. The first 
hypothesis was that experimental conditions would elicit greater levels of anxiety compared 
to control conditions. This would translate to inferior perceptual anticipation performance in 
high anxiety participants compared to low anxiety participants. In turn, this would denote that 
their ability to inhibit task irrelevant stimuli had been impaired. Leading on from this, it was 
hypothesised that greater anxiety levels in the high complexity task (dual task paradigm) as 
opposed to the low complexity task (single task paradigm) would lead to impaired perceptual 
anticipation performance due to the greater amount of pressure to maintain performance. 
Similar to previous literature, it was hypothesised that participants high in state and trait 
anxiety levels would perform worse compared to low state and trait anxiety participants. 
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Anxiety impairs attentional control by increasing the influence of the stimulus-driven 
attentional system in relation to using dual task paradigms (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and 
Calvo, 2007). Thus, it was hypothesised that there would be an increase in mental effort in 
the dual task paradigm, as opposed to the single task paradigm, to maintain performance 
levels of perceptual anticipation and random generation performance, thus reducing 
processing efficiency. As dual tasks involve the use of the shifting function to positively shift 
between tasks, it was predicted that anxiety would impair task switching, as anxiety 
habitually impairs processing efficiency and performance effectiveness on tasks involving the 
shifting function (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007). Lastly, like the shifting 
function, it was hypothesised that anxiety would impair the inhibition and updating functions 
in the dual task paradigm, thus impairing random response generation performance. As 
anxiety habitually impairs processing efficiency (and performance effectiveness) on tasks 
involving the inhibition and updating functions, it was predicted that there would be a 
significant detrimental effect on these functions in a central executive demanding task, more 
so in a dual task paradigm. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty tennis players of low skill level (Mage = 31.2 ± 12.8 years) participated in this study. 
Prior to the day of the experiment, participants completed an informed consent form and the 
trait scale of the state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg 
and Jacobs, 1983). No participants were aware or familiar with any literature regarding ACT 
or dual task paradigms. 
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Apparatus 
The anticipation video task was presented on a video projection unit (In house, Canterbury) 
using a 20-tennis shot video sequence for participants to view. An answer sheet with a scale 
drawing of the sports surface was used to aid the participant’s responses (see Appendix 4). 
Measures for the random response generation task were recorded on the RGCalc software 
programme designed by Towse and Neil (1998). SPSS software programme (IBM SPSS 
Statistics for Windows, Version 22.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.) was used for all data 
analyses once testing was complete. Trait anxiety was measured using the trait scale of the 
STAI prior to testing, while state anxiety was measured using the 6-item short form state 
scale of the Spielberger STAI (Marteau and Bekker, 1992) in between tasks. The Rating 
Scale of Mental Effort (RSME, Zijlstra, 1993) was used to measure and compare invested 
mental effort after each task. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were first instructed to complete the 6-item short form of the STAI prior to any 
task. Participants were then randomly selected to either perform a) anticipation primary task, 
or b) random response generation (RRG) primary task (both low complexity tasks), in which 
participants were given a practice trial of five shots to anticipate and to generate ten random 
numbers at a rate of 2Hz, respectively. This was actioned to reduce the possibility of any 
learning effect. After completion of the first primary task, participants would complete the 6-
item short form of the STAI and RSME, recording their anxiety and mental effort scores, 
respectively. Participants would then perform their second primary task and again, complete 
the short form of the STAI and RSME after completing this task (regardless of order). Once 
both primary tasks had been completed, participants would proceed to and complete the final 
task, a dual task. After completing the dual task, participants would complete one more 6-
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item short form of the STAI and RSME. Scores from the final 6-item short form of the STAI 
(post-dual task) allocated participants to either the Low State Anxiety (≤10) or High State 
Anxiety (≥11) responder group (see below for more details). This was required to ensure an 
analysis could take place (Note: Participants were originally allocated through trait anxiety 
scores from the trait scale of the STAI. This issue is addressed in the Discussion). 
 
Tasks 
Anticipation Primary Task 
Participants viewed a video sequence of 20 different tennis scenarios. Each scenario would be 
a different tennis shot. Each shot was followed by a 3 second period within which the video 
sequence went blank. Participants were instructed to generate a response, in which 
participants anticipated where the ball would land on their side of the court, based upon the 
information offered from the video sequences. A scale drawing of half a tennis court was 
provided to aid their response (see Appendix 4). The required response was either A, B, C, D, 
E or F for ‘Fault’. Fault shots were used to create a more realistic and comparable task to a 
real-life game, given that not every shot is ‘in’. 
 
Random Response Generation (RRG) Primary Task 
For the purpose of this study, a random number generation (RNG) task was used for the RRG 
primary task. RNG entails participants to generate a response that is minimally associated 
with what preceded before. The participants were instructed to say a number between 1 and 9 
out loud in a random sequence to an auditory signal produced at 2Hz for 2 minutes (same 
length of time as the anticipation primary task). In total, 60 responses were generated by each 
participant in both the random generation primary task (and later dual task). If the participant 
had not recorded 60 responses by the end of the 2 minutes, they were instructed to continue 
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until completion. The importance of maintaining a consistent response rhythm was also 
emphasised before starting the task. To illustrate the notion of randomness (with 
replacement), the participants were given the analogy of picking a number out of a hat, 
reading it out loud, putting the number back, and then picking another continuously (Miyake 
et al., 2000). Answers were recorded by the examiner (see Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1 – RRG Primary Task (RGCalc) with response alternatives and participant’s 
responses. 
 
Dual Task 
The final task for this study used a ‘loading paradigm’ dual task, in which both primary tasks 
listed above were performed simultaneously. While recording their answers for the 
anticipation component of the task, participants were again instructed to say aloud a number 
between 1 and 9 every 2Hz (during the blank slides of the video sequence also). This type of 
task was used to impose greater demands on the central executive compared to performing 
both primary tasks on their own. The anticipation video featured the same shots used in the 
first primary task, however sequence order was changed. Scores were recorded and compared 
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with primary task scores from the single task paradigms for both the anticipation and RRG 
components. 
 
Experimental Conditions 
This study had two groups: a control and an experimental group. Participants in the 
control group performed this experiment under low stress conditions without any outside 
distractors that could influence their performance, whereas participants in the 
experimental group performed under high stress conditions. These conditions involved 
the manipulation of evaluative instructions and information, and participants being 
subject to evaluation via video recording. These stipulations were used to induce greater 
levels of anxiety in an attempt to disrupt their attentional control and anticipation skills. 
Participants were informed that: 
• The anticipation tasks were a reliable indicator of talent in tennis and that their 
scores were transferable to their performance in a real game. Unlike the control 
group, participants would be given false feedback i.e. participants were informed 
of their scores after each task and ‘how badly’ their scores compared to the other 
participants in the control group in order to instigate higher levels of anxiety (see 
Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams, 2016). 
• Their scores from the random generation primary task and dual task were a 
unique and reliable measure of determining their ability to process and update 
information under pressure (see Peters, Giesbrecht, Jelicic and Merckelbach, 
2007). 
• Their performance in all tasks (recorded on camera) was to be evaluated by a 
professional tennis coach and their peers, thus eliciting greater levels of anxiety 
(see Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams 2016; Vater, Roca and Williams, 2016; 
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Note: All participants were informed post-testing that all video recordings were 
deleted). 
• Their behaviour from how they performed in all of the tasks, particularly when 
under pressure, would be an indicator of how they behave in a group of people 
and/or society (see Vater, Roca and Williams, 2016). 
 
Measures 
State Anxiety: 
The 6-item short form of the STAI was used to measure state anxiety levels across all tasks 
and pre-testing. The STAI is a self-report inventory that has proven to be a reliable and valid 
measure of anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg and Jacobs, 1983). These 
questionnaires use direct-worded items to represent the presence of anxiety in a statement 
such as ‘I am worried’ and reverse-worded items to represent the absence of anxiety in a 
statement such as ‘I feel calm’. Reverse-worded item scores (as evident in the name), were 
reversed when calculating total scores (i.e. scores of 1, 2, 3 and 4 were reversed to 4, 3, 2, 1, 
respectively). The 6-item short form of the STAI was used due to its ability to be less time 
consuming than its parent 20-item state scale. Previous research has shown the 6-item short 
form state scale to have positive internal consistency, reliability and validity when associated 
with its parent 20-item state scale (Tluczek, Henriques and Brown, 2009). For the 6-item 
short form of the STAI (and trait scale of the STAI), participants were instructed to complete 
a ‘Self-Evaluation Questionnaire’, not an anxiety questionnaire, to avoid influencing their 
answers in any way. 
 
Response Accuracy: 
Response accuracy was assessed based on the participant’s responses to each shot in the 
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anticipation primary task and dual task. Response accuracy was measured as the percentage 
of correct responses produced by the participants (scores out of 20 in both the anticipation 
primary task and dual task). Response accuracy scores were assessed between the 
anticipation primary (low complexity) and dual (high complexity) task, as well as between 
low and high trait anxiety and state anxiety responder groups. 
 
Mental Effort: 
The RSME was used to measure and compare invested mental effort after each task. It is a 
one-dimensional subjective scale where participants estimate the effort they invested into 
each task (Williams, Vickers and Rodrigues, 2001) and has been “… used as an 
operationalisation of processing efficiency” (Zijlstra, 1993, pp. 137). The scale ranges from 0 
to 150 with nine descriptive indicators (0 being not at all effortful and 150 being very 
effortful). Zijlstra (1993) regards the RSME score as an adequate estimation of the mental 
costs associated with task execution. It has been reported as a valid and reliable measure of 
mental effort (Veltman and Gaillard, 1996), and has demonstrated strong support for the 
predictions of PET and ACT (Wilson, 2008). As mentioned above, it is habitually observed 
that processing efficiency decreases as more attentional resources are invested to maintain a 
given performance level. Thus, it is predicted that the greater the score participants record, 
the lower their processing efficiency will be. The shifting function of ACT was measured 
through the RSME i.e. the greater effort participants used to maintain performance in both 
tasks in the dual task paradigm, the lower their processing efficiency and thus their ability to 
shift successfully between tasks. 
 
Random Response Generation (RRG): 
Response sequencing data was analysed using the RGCalc software programme (see Figure 2 
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below; Towse and Neil, 1998). Specifically, data was recorded in three ways; the use of 
multiple performance indices is fundamental insofar as each only measures a certain aspect of 
response bias: 
• Random Number Generation (RNG) measures the frequency of response pairs i.e. 
how often any response alternative follows any other response alternative. RNG is 
calculated as: 
 
Here, nij is the frequency count for each possible combination of successive 
responses, and ni represents the frequency of occurrence of the ith response 
alternative. The range for the RNG score is between 0-1, where the greater repetition 
of the response pairs, the greater the RNG score. (For a more complete explanation of 
the example calculations, see Towse & Neil, 1998). 
• Redundancy (R) is an informational measure derived from Baddeley’s Information 
Theory (1966). This indice reflects the equality of response distribution (i.e. is each 
number chosen as often as equally as possible?) and as alternatives are produced with 
too great or small a frequency, R scores will increase. R scores are obtained as 
follows: 
 
Here, n is the number of random responses produced, ni is the frequency with which 
the ith item is produced, and m is the number of response alternatives. 
• Mean Repetition Gap (MRG) depicts quantitative measures of repetition performance 
from repetition distances scores. This measure is obtained via counting the number of 
gaps between two identical digits. The mean of this number is then calculated 
(Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994; Peters, Giesbrecht, Jelicic and Merckelbach, 2007). 
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Figure 2 – Functions: Random Number Generation (RNG), Redundancy (R) and Mean 
Repetition Gap (MRG). 
 
The inhibition function of ACT was measured via the indice RNG, while the updating  
function was measured via the indices R and MRG. 
 
Data Analysis 
A Paired Samples T-test was conducted to compare response accuracy scores in the 
anticipation primary (low complexity) and dual (high complexity) tasks. Two-way repeated 
measures analysis of variance (RM ANOVAs) were used to analyse response accuracy scores 
between low and high anxiety groups across the low and high complexity tasks. Numerous 
separate two-way RM ANOVAs were used to analyse state and trait anxiety, mental effort, 
and random response measures RNG, R and MRG across all tasks. Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were administered had Mauchly's Test of Sphericity been violated (p<0.05) 
otherwise Sphericity was assumed. Partial eta squared (η2) was used as a measure of effect 
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size for all analyses (except for response accuracy between task complexities). The α level (p) 
for statistical significance was set at 0.05. 
 
Results 
State Anxiety 
There was a significant main effect in state anxiety scores across tasks within trait anxiety 
groups (F 1.506, 57.212 = 24.857, p<0.05, η2 = 0.393). The RRG primary task elicited a greater 
anxiety response as compared to the anticipation primary task, while the dual task elicited the 
greatest anxiety response from pre-testing (increases of 1.36 and 2.56 in the low trait anxiety 
control and experimental groups, respectively, and 4.9 and 2.86 in the high trait anxiety 
control and experimental groups, respectively). There was no significant interaction between 
control and experimental conditions (p>0.05, η2 = 0.015). The anxiety manipulations had no 
significant effect within the control or experimental conditions (F 1.506, 57.212 = 0.036, p=0.929, 
η2 = 0.001). 
 
Response Accuracy (Task Complexity) 
There was a significant difference in response accuracy scores in the low complexity task (M 
= 52.25, SD = 11.32) and high complexity task (M = 43.88, SD = 12.06); t(39) = 5.062, 
p<0.05. 
 
Response Accuracy (Trait Anxiety Groups) 
There was a significant main effect in response accuracy scores within the low and high 
complexity tasks (F 1, 38 = 24.307, p<0.05, η2 = 0.39). No significant interaction was revealed 
between trait anxiety groups (p>0.05, η2 = 0.001). No significant effect was shown in 
response accuracy scores within the trait anxiety groups (F 1, 38 = 0.05, p=0.943, η2 = 0.000). 
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Low trait anxiety sub-groups (control and experimental) recorded greater response accuracy 
scores in the low (M = 52.61, SD = 10.65) and high complexity tasks (M = 44.13, SD = 
11.64) compared to the high trait anxiety sub-groups (M = 51.76, SD = 12.49; M = 43.53, SD 
= 12.96, respectively). 
 
Response Accuracy (Trait Anxiety Groups and State Anxiety Scores) 
A significant main effect was evident in response accuracy scores within the anticipation 
primary and dual tasks (F 1, 37 = 4.73, p<0.05, η2 = 0.113). Participants recorded greater 
response accuracy scores in the anticipation primary task (M = 52.25, SD = 11.32) compared 
to the dual task (M = 43.88, SD = 12.06). There were no significant interactions between 
final state anxiety scores (p>0.05, η2 = 0.017) or trait anxiety groups between tasks, (p>0.05, 
η2 = 0.001). There were no significant effects evident in the low and high complexity tasks 
for either the trait anxiety groups (F 1, 37 = 0.107, p=0.745, η2 = 0.003) or final state anxiety 
scores post-dual task (F 1, 37 = 0.718, p=0.402, η2 = 0.019). 
 
Response Accuracy (State Anxiety Responder Groups) 
There was a significant main effect in response accuracy within the anticipation primary and 
dual tasks (F 1, 38 = 24.355, p<0.05, η2 = 0.391). There was no significant interaction in 
response accuracy scores in the anticipation primary and dual tasks between state anxiety 
groups, (p>0.05, η2 = 0.002). No significant effect was evident in response accuracy scores 
within state anxiety responder groups, (F 1, 38 = 0.87, p>0.05, η2 = 0.01). Collectively, low 
state (M = 53.18, SD = 10.53) and high state anxiety (M = 51.11, SD = 12.43) responder sub-
groups recorded greater response accuracy scores in the anticipation primary task compared 
to the dual task (M = 43.86, SD = 10.90, and M = 43.89, SD = 13.67, respectively). 
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Table 1 – Mean Response Accuracy (%) scores for State Anxiety Responder and State/Trait 
Anxiety sub-groups (standard deviation in parentheses). 
Anxiety Group Anticipation Primary Task Dual Task 
Low State 53.18 (10.53) 43.86 (10.9) 
High State 51.11 (12.43) 43.89 (13.67) 
Low State/Low Trait 55.63 (9.46) 45 (10.95) 
Low State/High Trait 46.67 (11.25) 40.83 (11.14) 
High State/Low Trait 45.71 (10.58) 42.14 (13.8) 
High State/High Trait 54.55 (12.74) 45 (14.14) 
 
Response Accuracy (State Anxiety Responder Groups and Trait Anxiety Scores) 
There was a significant main effect in response accuracy within the anticipation primary and 
dual tasks (F 1, 36 = 17.121, p<0.05, η2 = 0.322). No interactions were found in response 
accuracy scores between state anxiety responder groups (p>0.05, η2 = 0.000), trait anxiety 
scores (p>0.05, η2 = 0.000), and state anxiety responder groups*trait anxiety scores (p>0.05, 
η2 = 0.078). No significant effect was revealed for response accuracy scores between state 
anxiety responder groups (F 1, 36 = 0.219, p=0.643, η2 = 0.006), trait anxiety scores (F 1, 36 = 
0.027, p=0.87, η2 = 0.001), or state anxiety responder groups*trait anxiety scores (F 1, 36 = 
2.269, p=0.141, η2 = 0.059). The high state, high trait anxiety group recorded greater response 
accuracy scores in the anticipation primary task (M = 54.55, SD = 12.74) and dual task (M = 
45, SD = 14.14) than the high state, low trait and low state, high trait anxiety sub-groups and 
performed to the same level as the low state, low trait anxiety sub-groups in both tasks also. 
 
Mental Effort 
There was a significant main effect in mental effort for all participants within all three tasks, 
(F 2, 76 = 68.733, p<0.05, η2 = 0.644). There was no significant interaction between state 
anxiety responder groups and mental effort used (p>0.05, η2 = 0.053; see Table 2). There was 
a significant main effect within state anxiety responder groups (F 2, 76 = 3.736, p<0.05, η2 = 
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0.09). The low state anxiety responder group used greater mental effort in the anticipation 
primary task compared to the random generation primary task, though both state anxiety 
groups used significantly greater effort in the high complexity dual task. 
Table 2 – Mean Mental Effort, RNG, Redundancy, and Mean Repetition Gap scores for State 
Anxiety Responder groups (standard deviation in parentheses). 
Measures Low State Anxiety High State Anxiety 
Mental Effort (Anticipation Primary Task) 45.23 (16.44) 45 (19.47) 
Mental Effort (RNG Primary Task) 35.23 (16.22) 52.5 (26.14) 
Mental Effort (Dual Task) 73.86 (19.33) 80.56 (26.4) 
RNG (RNG Primary Task) .302 (0.164) 0.288 (0.087) 
RNG (Dual Task) .313 (0.166) .321 (0.101) 
Redundancy (RNG Primary Task) 1.291 (0.729) 1.827 (0.951) 
Redundancy (Dual Task) 1.868 (1.202) 3.409 (3.783) 
Mean Repetition Gap (RNG Primary Task) 8.66 (0.23) 8.38 (0.43) 
Mean Repetition Gap (Dual Task) 8.56 (0.37) 8.21 (0.82) 
 
Random Response Generation 
RNG 
There was no significant effect in RNG scores in the RRG primary and dual tasks (F 1, 38 = 
2.064, p=0.159, η2 = 0.052). No interaction was found in RNG scores between state anxiety 
responder groups (p > 0.05, η2 = 0.000; see Table 2). No significant effect in RNG scores was 
found either within state anxiety responder groups, F (1, 38) = 0.584, p = 0.45, η2 = 0.015. 
RNG scores in the high state anxiety responder group (M = 0.2878, SD = 0.0873) revealed to 
be lower than the low state anxiety responder group (M = 0.3024, SD = 0.1636) in the RRG 
primary task, though the opposite was found in the dual task with the high state anxiety 
responder group (M = 0.3214, SD = 0.1009) being greater than the low state anxiety 
responder group (M = 0.3127, SD = 0.1657). 
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Redundancy 
There was a significant main effect in R scores within the RRG primary and dual tasks (F 1, 38 
= 6.503, p<0.05, η2 = 0.146). There was a significant interaction between tasks and state 
anxiety responder groups (p<0.05, η2 = 0.114). It is clear that there was a greater detrimental 
effect on R scores in the high state anxiety responder group between the RRG primary task 
(M = 1.827, SD = 0.951) and the dual task (M = 3.409, SD = 3.783). No significant effect 
was evident within state anxiety responder groups (F 1, 38 = 1.412, p=0.242, η2 = 0.036). Mean 
R scores for the high state anxiety responder group in the RRG primary task (M = 1.8266, SD 
= 0.9509) were found to be almost equal to the low state anxiety group’s R scores in the dual 
task (M = 1.868, SD = 1.2017). 
 
Mean Repetition Gap 
There was no significant effect in MRG scores within the random generation primary and 
dual tasks (F 1, 38 = 1.431, p=0.239, η2 = 0.036). There was a significant interaction between 
state anxiety responder groups (p<0.05, η2 = 0.181). The switch from low to high complexity 
and increase in pressure to perform elicited a greater detrimental effect on MRG scores in the 
high state anxiety responder group between the RRG primary task (M = 8.38, SD = 0.43) and 
dual task (M = 8.21, SD = 0.82) as compared to the low state anxiety responder group (M = 
8.66, SD = 0.23 and M = 8.56, SD = 0.37, respectively). No significant effect was found 
within state anxiety responder groups (F 1, 38 = 0.078, p=0.781, η2 = 0.002). 
 
Discussion 
To recap, the experiment for this study examined the effects of anxiety on attentional control 
and perceptual anticipation through the use of a tennis-based and random number generation 
task in a dual task paradigm. Like the hypotheses, measures (in method), and results sections, 
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this discussion will follow the same order with regards to what was examined (state anxiety, 
response accuracy, mental effort, and random response generation). 
 
State anxiety was the first measure to be assessed post experiment. The greatest increases in 
state anxiety levels from pre-testing to post-dual task were found in the high trait anxiety 
control and experimental sub-groups, however there was no significant effect between low 
and high trait anxiety groups. The low trait anxiety control sub-group displayed decreases in 
state anxiety levels in both primary tasks compared to pre-testing, though a major increase 
was observed after completion of the dual task, likely due to the greater pressure to perform. 
Unlike the aforementioned sub-group, the low trait anxiety experimental sub-group, showed 
only minor increases in state anxiety levels after completion of each of the primary tasks. An 
interesting finding is that state anxiety scores for both trait anxiety control sub-groups were 
greater than the trait anxiety experimental sub-groups. Reasons for this could be due to the 
lower participant count for the experimental group (sample size) not being able to yield a 
relatively equal comparison, or that the participants in the control group were already 
experiencing high levels of state anxiety prior to the start of the experiment. State anxiety 
scores from these tasks suggest that there was indeed an anxiety response, particularly in the 
dual task. Though these results offer very little support to the assumptions of ACT as no 
significant interaction was evident between the control and experimental conditions or the 
response in state anxiety levels. 
 
As predicted, the increase in task complexity was profoundly enough to collectively impair 
the participants ability to perceptually anticipate, leading to reduced response accuracy scores 
in the dual task. Due to the nature of the dual task demanding attentional resources to be 
allocated to more than one task and the greater amount of pressure to maintain performance, 
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it is assumed that as a result there was a greater influence on the stimulus-driven attentional 
system during completion of the dual task, as is stated in ACT (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos 
and Calvo, 2007). This implies that the ability to perceptually anticipate in the dual task had 
been impaired. 
 
As predicted, both the low and high trait anxiety sub-groups recorded greater response 
accuracy scores in the anticipation primary task as compared to the dual task. Collectively, 
the control group performed better than the experimental group, in both tasks. A significant 
decrease in performance was evident, more so in the control group compared to the 
experimental group, for both low and high trait anxiety sub-groups. Anticipation skill has 
clearly been impaired as a result of greater levels of stress and the use of a high complexity 
task. It is interesting to note though that the high trait anxiety control sub-group had a greater 
response accuracy than the low trait anxiety control sub-group (likely due to sample size). 
Though Janelle (2002) has earlier noted that performance levels in a given task can be 
matched under high stress conditions or high pressure situations. However, this will only 
happen if the individual works hard enough to maintain performance levels (uses greater 
mental effort; see below). Janelle (2002) notes that in some cases, when an individual 
experiences anxiety, performance levels can increase as a result of the motivational aspects of 
anxiety seizing the additional resources for cognitive task performance. This may explain 
why a select few participants were able to maintain perceptual anticipation performance. 
Despite this, participants in the experimental group were predicted to score significantly 
lower than they did. This finding does question the effectiveness of the type of anticipation 
task used or the manner in which it was executed, though it does provide a valuable insight 
into the relationship between anxiety, anticipation performance and mental effort. Again, as 
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previously mentioned above for other findings, this could have been due to a sample size 
issue. 
 
After re-evaluation of these results, statistical analyses for all measures were grouped by final 
state anxiety scores post-dual task, namely ‘state anxiety responders’, which were then 
grouped by ‘low’ (N=22) and ‘high’ (N=18) state anxiety responder groups. It was clear that 
the evaluative instructions given to participants under experimental conditions instigated no 
significant response in either trait anxiety groups, thus affecting comparisons of overall 
results up until this point. This was also actioned due to the aims of this study looking for 
significant state anxiety responses amongst participants in low and high complexity tasks. 
Stress condition was hence ignored.  
 
Response accuracy was tested again by state anxiety responder groups, though again, no 
significant effect was found. There was a similar correlation between response accuracy 
scores when compared between trait anxiety and state anxiety responder groups, showing a 
reduction in perceptual anticipation skill in the dual task. Similar to the trait anxiety groups, 
is it assumed that there was a greater influence on the stimulus-driven attentional system, 
causing reduced perceptual anticipation skill. One outstanding finding was found in that the 
high state anxiety responder group performed better in the dual task as compared to the low 
state anxiety responder group. One explanation for this could be that high state anxiety 
responder group employed greater effort to maintain performance, the next measure to be 
discussed. 
 
As mentioned above, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo (2007) claim in ACT that as 
more attentional resources are allocated to a specific task to maintain performance levels of a 
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given task, the resultant effect is that processing efficiency decreases, specifically in dual task 
paradigms. The amount of mental effort employed to maintain performance under greater 
pressure increased as predicted across tasks, though there was no significant interaction 
between the low and high state anxiety responder groups. This keeps with Nibbeling, 
Oudejans and Daanens’ (2012) findings in that both novices and experts demonstrated 
increases in mental effort and decreases in performance in the secondary task, illustrating a 
detrimental effect on processing efficiency with the presence of anxiety. With regards to 
perceptual anticipation skill, despite increased mental effort, collectively response accuracy 
scores decreased, potentially demonstrating a decrease in processing efficiency and 
performance effectiveness. There were very few participants that were able to maintain their 
perceptual anticipation performance, and even fewer who improved in their response 
accuracy scores, though this was at the expense of using greater mental effort and therefore 
having a reduced processing efficiency. Interestingly though, the low state anxiety group 
recorded a marginally greater mental effort score in the anticipation primary task compared to 
the high state anxiety group. Neither of these results were predicted. 
 
Relaying back to response accuracy scores and the retaining of perceptual anticipation 
performance, it can be assumed that through the increase in mental effort to maintain 
perceptual anticipation performance, there was a detrimental ‘knock off; effect on random 
response generation performance (explained below). Consequently, it cannot be wholly 
assumed that through increased mental effort from the low complexity tasks to the high 
complexity task that processing efficiency was significantly impaired, furthermore it cannot 
be assumed that the shifting function was significantly impaired also. A case can be made 
that the shifting function was impaired to an extent with regards to maintaining perceptual 
anticipation skill and random response generation performance. 
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To reiterate, the RGCalc software programme was used to measure random response 
generation performance. The task of random number generation draws on multiple executive 
functions, requiring the inhibition function to suppress habitual and stereotyped responses. It 
also requires the updating function to monitor response distribution (Miyake et al., 2000). 
The nature and multidimensionality of the random number generation task emphasises the 
necessity of using multiple randomness indices in order to examine random response 
generation performance. This is predominantly dependent on what aspects of executive 
functioning one wishes to investigate (Miyake et al., 2000). Findings regarding the inhibition 
function demonstrate no significant impairments whatsoever in the dual task when compared 
with the random response generation primary task. It cannot be assumed that, while 
performance in the dual task marginally increased RNG scores in both state anxiety responder 
groups, the inhibition function was impaired. It is likely that this is the result of no apparent 
influences in the goal-driven attentional system during completion of the random response 
generation primary and dual tasks. Another suggestion as to the scores recorded regarding the 
inhibition function would be participants worked harder to maintain performance, as Janelle 
(2002) has stated can happen. 
 
The updating function was measured via the two indices R and MRG. An increase in R scores 
and a decrease in MRG scores would signify an impairment in the updating function. This 
was found in the shift from a random response generation primary task to the dual task. As 
the R indice is responsible for the reflection of equality of response distribution, it can be 
assumed that the dual task caused participants to either repeat numbers too often or 
completely disregard certain numbers altogether. A significant interaction was found between 
both state anxiety responder groups, demonstrating that the updating function was impaired 
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in participants who experienced greater levels of state anxiety. The high state anxiety 
responder group recorded significantly worse R and MRG scores compared to the low state 
anxiety responder group. Furthermore, the high state anxiety responder group demonstrated a 
significantly greater decrease in performance for both indices compared to the low state 
anxiety group also. It can be assumed that there was a significant influence in the stimulus-
driven system with regards to monitoring and updating information in this task. Evidently, 
the switch from the random response generation primary task to dual task was sufficient in 
impairing the ability to update and monitor short term memory representations, specifically 
increasing R and decreasing MRG scores for both state anxiety responder groups. These 
results suggest that the updating function was significantly impaired in the dual task. 
 
As previously mentioned, ACT holds that as more attentional resources are allocated to a 
specific task to maintain performance levels in a dual task, processing efficiency and 
performance effectiveness typically decrease. The dual task was found to be a sufficient 
tool in impairing perceptual anticipation and, to an extent, attentional control. 
Collectively, the dual task paradigm induced greater levels of state anxiety amongst the 
participants in both state anxiety responder groups, more so in the high state anxiety 
responder group, as predicted. Taking mental effort scores into account, particularly in 
the dual task, this is equal. It can be assumed that participants did indeed use greater 
mental effort to maintain performance in the dual task due to the greater amount of 
pressure. This can be seen with regards to perceptual anticipation performance and the 
inhibition function, however, this has come at the cost of a reduced performance with 
regards to the shifting and updating functions. These findings demonstrate profound 
support that the dual task paradigm is an effective tool for influencing and impairing 
attentional control and perceptual anticipation skill. In this study, it can be assumed that 
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anxiety has impaired attentional control to an extent by having a considerable influence 
on the stimulus-driven attentional system. To date, the updating function has not been 
tested in sport performance research, thus these findings regarding the updating function 
warrant further investigation in future studies 
 
Future Recommendations 
While this study has attempted to expand on previous studies that have investigated the 
adverse effects of anxiety on perceptual anticipation performance and support the 
assumptions of ACT (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo, 2007) in a sport setting, 
this study clearly had its issues with regards to the methodology, the sample size for 
anxiety groups not generating significant data, and thus the results and unfulfilled 
hypotheses that came as a result. The evaluative instructions given to participants in the 
experimental group did not have the impact that was intended on participant’s state 
anxiety levels. There are many methods in which evaluative instructions and 
manipulation of tasks can instigate greater anxiety levels and this would be something to 
critically look into should this type of method be used again (see Vater, Roca and 
Williams, 2016). One such example would be to have a tennis coach or peer present for 
observation throughout the testing, in the hope of eliciting a greater state of worry and 
anxiety, and a more detrimental effect on perceptual anticipation performance. 
 
As previously mentioned, results could have been different had there been a greater 
sample size, which could have generated a different effect collectively between the 
control and experimental groups, and respective sub-groups. While these reasons have 
restricted the outcome of potentially significant results, it is important to note that prior to 
any testing, the control sub-groups displayed relatively high state anxiety scores, though 
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again this may also be a sample size issue also. It is highly recommended that if this 
study were to be repeated, a larger sample size is an absolute priority to allow for a more 
ecologically valid comparison of data and results. 
 
The perceptual anticipation component of the methodology was intended for participants to 
position themselves in an actual live tennis match scenario. With regards to testing perceptual 
anticipation performance further, this can be improved by adopting the work of Cocks, 
Jackson, Bishop and Williams (2016). Their study, in which participants are actively engaged 
in the task, used a life-sized display, in which video sequences of random tennis shots were 
projected onto a wall, while participants were positioned four metres away from the screen. 
Four areas, representing the four areas of the participant’s side of the court where the ball 
would land, were marked out at the participant’s feet. Following each individual shot, 
participants were instructed to step into the area they anticipated the ball would land in, 
stating the number (1, 2, 3 or 4) of that area. As the participants are physically exerting 
themselves (to a minor extent), this type of task clearly offers a more holistic approach as 
they are actively engaging in the naturalistic movements associated with tennis. 
 
Due to the frankness of the method used in this study, in which an anticipation task was used 
in conjunction with only neutral task-irrelevant stimuli (random generation component of the 
dual task) and no threatening stimuli, it is difficult to evaluate an individual’s perceptual 
anticipation skill further. One such method would be measuring and tracking eye movements. 
The antisaccade task was identified by Miyake et al. (2000) as a prime example. Hallet 
(1978) found that when predicting anxiety to impair the efficiency of attentional control 
involving the inhibition function, it could be tested more directly using the antisaccade task 
due to it involving the measurement of an individual’s eye movements. The task involves two 
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visual cues, one presented to the left and one to the right of the fixation point. The individual 
is instructed to make an eye movement to the opposite side of the visual cue as quickly as 
possible. One of the main dependent variables (of interest) is the latency of the first saccade 
to the correct side. A control task is also included known as the pro-saccade task, where an 
individual is instructed to fixate on the cue when it appears. This type of task can be 
transferred to testing the inhibition function and perceptual anticipation skill in a more 
critical manner. Wilson, Wood and Vine’s (2009) recent study into anxiety impairing 
performance in penalty kicks used a gaze registration system in which fixations to target 
locations (goal area and goalkeeper) were verified using frame-by-frame analysis. Like the 
antisaccade task, in which an individual’s eye movements are measured (Hallet, 1978), the 
measuring of eye movements in a tennis simulated task would provide more explanatory 
findings, in which the eye fixations can generate a consensus of how an individual performs. 
This consensus would be able to observe whether the individual focuses on the swing of the 
racket, the opponent’s body position prior to the swing, or if that individual is simply 
following the flight of the ball. Additionally, the inclusion of any form of threatening stimuli 
could be used to assess an individual’s performance even further. This could determine the 
allocation of attentional resources in the preparation phase of their return shot. This type of 
secondary task would have greater implications for ACT and potentially ACTS. 
 
Another suggestion for future studies looking to build on what has been achieved with this 
study, would be to utilise the temporal occlusion paradigm. This procedure allows the 
exploration of how much time is necessitated for an individual to visually identify the 
environmental contextual information that individual uses to perform a skill (in this case, 
make a decision as to the appropriate shot to make or the most appropriate area to aim their 
shot at; Magill, 2007). Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams (2016) used this paradigm in 
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their study and were able to generate 144 test stimuli. These included 48 match situations (12 
for each of the directional outcomes; short right, short left, deep right, deep left) in three 
contextual conditions; postural cue only (shot was occluded at ball-racket contact), 
animation, and wide angle (the latter two began from the serve through to the occlusion of 
target shot at racket-ball contact). In the instance of this study, videos of the scenarios could 
be occluded at the point the attacker receives the ball, rather than before the attacker receives 
the ball. This would offer the participants a more realistic scenario, due to the unpredictability 
and nature of tennis. Hence, employing this paradigm would be a more effective method in 
testing the assumptions of ACT and ACTS. 
 
As previously mentioned in the research section, there have been studies that have 
already tested the assumptions of ACT and perceptual anticipation in tennis (see Alder, 
Ford, Causer and Williams, 2016; Cocks, Jackson, Bishop and Williams, 2016). While 
this methodological design is relevant to tennis only, future studies could adopt this 
design and implement scenarios relevant to other sports. Future studies could extend the 
scope of testing perceptual anticipation into the realm of contact sports, particularly 
rugby, football and American football. Due to the nature of these team sports, including 
multiple opponents and the demand to make rapid decisions, this would be a viable area 
in sport to test perceptual anticipation. With regards to ACT, Wood (2010) has previously 
stated that future research may wish to test the assumptions of ACT and (ACTS, Groome 
and Eysenck, 2016) in more dynamic situations in the realm of sport, in which the 
inhibition of attentional resources towards threatening stimuli (opponents) and shifting of 
attentional resources between task-relevant stimuli (teammates) could be tested more 
thoroughly. 
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With regards to the updating function, future studies should look to use ‘in game’ situations 
as a vehicle to improving an individuals’ ability to update and process information, thus 
improving decision making and sporting performance. Such examples could use team game 
scenarios as providing an individual with previous penalty kicks by the same footballer to 
revise for a penalty shootout, or providing multiple scenarios of rugby line-outs to better an 
individuals’ decision making and defensive ability. This would be invaluable in testing ACT 
and ACTS. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the limitations in findings and the critical analysis of the methodology not fulfilling 
its intended purposes, this study has offered a fresh insight into testing all of the assumptions 
of ACT and perceptual anticipation skill in dual task paradigms. The primary concern 
regarding the methodology was the evaluative instructions given to participants in the high 
stress conditions, which in turn instigated a re-evaluation of data analysis. With regards to the 
hypotheses presented at the start of the study, it can be assumed that the current experiment 
was insufficient in attaining the required results to support all of the hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, a select few of the hypotheses have been proven and thus provided relatively 
mild support for the assumptions for ACT. Perceptual anticipation skill was found to be 
significantly reduced under high pressure conditions and in the dual task. Interestingly, the 
least investigated function, updating, was found to be one of the highlighting elements of the 
study, showing critical impairment in the dual task paradigm, whereas the inhibition and 
shifting functions are open to further research in this type of study. The use of a dual task 
paradigm to test the assumptions of ACT has proven to be a useful tool, demonstrating minor 
and major impairments in multiple functions of attentional control, and used in conjunction 
with testing perceptual anticipation, has offered a unique and effective manner to testing 
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sporting skills. While it cannot be wholly assumed that attentional control was significantly 
impaired in this study, there are interesting findings that have unearthed new pathways into 
the realm of testing ACT, ACTS, perceptual anticipation, and dual task paradigms, and thus 
improving sporting performance for future endeavours. 
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Appendix 1 – Trait Subscale of State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 
1983). 
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Appendix 2 – Six-Item Short-Form of Spielberger STAI (Marteau and Bekker, 1992). 
Self-Evaluation Questionnaire (Y-6 item) 
Name: .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date: . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Read each statement and then circle the most appropriate number to the right of the statement 
to indicate how you feel right now, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 
describe your present feelings best. 
 
 
Pre-Testing Score:  
 
 
 
Post-Primary Task 1 Score: 
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Post-Primary Task 2 Score: 
 
 
 
Post-Secondary Task Score: 
 
Please make sure that you have answered all the questions. 
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Appendix 3 – Rating Scale of Mental Effort (Zijlstra, 1993). 
Please indicate, by marking the vertical axis below, how much effort it took for you to 
complete the task you’ve just finished. 
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Appendix 4 – Scoring Sheet. 
Participant’s side of court (Boxes A and B – service boxes; C, D and E – back side of court; 
net and tramlines not included). 
 
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
D 
 
 
E 
 
Primary Task Score: 
1)                                                                    11) 
2)                                                                    12) 
3)                                                                    13) 
4)                                                                    14) 
5)                                                                    15) 
6)                                                                    16) 
7)                                                                    17) 
8)                                                                    18) 
9)                                                                    19) 
10)                                                                    20) 
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Participant’s side of court (Boxes A and B – front half of court; Boxes C, D and E – back side 
of court; net and tramlines not included). 
 
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
D 
 
 
E 
 
Dual Task Score: 
1)                                                                    11) 
2)                                                                    12) 
3)                                                                    13) 
4)                                                                    14) 
5)                                                                    15) 
6)                                                                    16) 
7)                                                                    17) 
8)                                                                    18) 
9)                                                                    19) 
10)                                                                    20) 
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Appendix 5 – Informed Consent Form and Information Leaflet. 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
MSc by Research 
Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences, Canterbury Christ Church University 
 
Name of Student: David Mitchell 
 
Name of University Supervisor(s): Mr Jon Swain and Dr Mark Uphill 
 
Title of Research Project: An Examination of Attentional Control Theory, Perceptual 
Anticipation and Dual Task Paradigms. 
 
I would like to thank you for your consideration to be a participant in this study, without 
which, this study would not be possible. 
 
Purpose of the research: 
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between anxiety and performance in a 
sport setting using a single task and dual task (two tasks performed concurrently) paradigm. It 
is well known that individuals who experience high levels of anxiety tend to perform worse 
than those who experience low levels. This study aims to test individuals who experience 
different levels of anxiety in a series of tasks, in an attempt to induce greater levels of anxiety 
to disrupt their processing efficiency and the functions of attentional control. 
 
Participation in this research will involve: 
Participants will complete several questionnaires (listed below) and complete three tasks (two 
single-task paradigms and one dual task paradigm). Below is a timeline and rough estimate of 
the time it will take to complete each component of the study:- 
 
1. One day before the experiment, participants will complete this Informed Consent 
Form (should they wish to participate), the Marlowe-Crowne Scale of Social 
Desirability, and the Trait subscale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Time to 
complete – 10-15 minutes). 
2. On the day of, prior to the experiment, participants will complete the State subscale of 
the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, allocating them into either the Low or High 
Anxiety group for the study (Time to complete – 5-10 minutes). 
3. Primary Task 1 – an anticipatory-tennis-shot video where participants will estimate 
where the ball will land on their side of the court (Time to complete – 2-3 minutes). 
4. Participants will complete the six-item short-form of the State subscale of the State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory and the Rating Scale of Mental Effort (Time to complete – 2 
minutes). 
5. Primary Task 2 – a random number generation task, in which participants will say out 
loud a random number between 1-9, every second for 2 minutes (Time to complete – 
2 minutes) 
6. Same as Step 4 (Time to complete – 2 minutes). 
7. Dual Task – a combination of both Primary tasks listed above, performed 
concurrently (Time to complete – 2-3 minutes). 
8. Same as Step 4/6 (Time to complete – 2 minutes). 
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Foreseeable risks or discomforts: 
There will be no physical risks involved in this study. However, participants who suffer from 
anxiety and find themselves panicking/find the tasks too difficult, may stop at any time. 
 
What will happen to your data: 
Any data/ results from your participation in the study will be used by David Mitchell as part 
of their project work. The data will also be available to Mr Jon Swain and Dr Mark Uphill. It 
may also be published in academic works, but your name or identity will not be revealed. 
 
All data and personal information will be stored securely within CCCU premises in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the University’s own data protection 
requirements. Data can only be accessed by David Mitchell, as well as Mr Jon Swain and Dr 
Mark Uphill for supervisor reasons. After completion of the study, all data will be made 
anonymous (i.e. all personal information associated with the data will be removed). 
 
If you have any questions or queries, David will be happy to answer them. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a participant or feel you have been placed at risk you can 
contact Jon Swain and/or Mark Uphill on 01227 767700 on extensions 3211/3184. 
 
I confirm that I have read the above information. The nature, demands and risks of the project 
have been explained to me. I have been informed that there will be no benefits/ payments to 
me for participation. 
 
 
I knowingly assume the risks involved and understand that I may withdraw my consent and 
discontinue participation at any time without penalty and without having to give any reason. 
 
Participant’s signature ____________________________________ Date 
_____________ 
 
Investigator’s signature ____________________________________ Date 
_____________ 
 
 
Note that for anyone under the age of 18 (and for other vulnerable groups) informed consent 
MUST be given by the next of kin- usually a PARENT or GUARDIAN. It cannot be given 
by a teacher or coach etc. Such participants cannot be used unless you have been given 
specific permission as part of your ethical approval. 
 
The signed copy of this form is retained by the student, and at the end of the project passed 
on to the supervisor. 
A second copy of the consent form should be given to the participant for them to keep for 
their own reference. 
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INFORMATION LEAFLET 
MSc by Research 
Faculty of Social and Applied Sciences, Canterbury Christ Church University 
 
Name of Student: David Mitchell     
 
Name of University Supervisor(s): Mr Jon Swain and Dr Mark Uphill 
 
TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT: An Examination of Attentional Control Theory, 
Perceptual Anticipation and Dual Task Paradigms. 
 
I would like to thank you for your consideration to be a participant in this study, without 
which, this study would not be possible. 
 
By answering our questions, you are consenting to your data being used in my study. No 
record will be made of your name so information is all anonymous. 
 
Note that for anyone under the age of 18 informed consent MUST be given by a PARENT or 
GUARDIAN. Such participants cannot be used at all unless you have been given specific 
permission as part of your ethical approval. 
 
Purpose of the research: 
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between anxiety and performance in a 
sport setting using a single task and dual task (two tasks performed concurrently) paradigm. It 
is well known that individuals who experience high levels of anxiety tend to perform worse 
than those who experience low levels. This study aims to test individuals who experience 
different levels of anxiety in a series of tasks, in an attempt to induce greater levels of anxiety 
to disrupt their processing efficiency and the functions of attentional control. 
 
Participation in this research will involve: 
Participants will complete several questionnaires (listed below) and complete three tasks (two 
single-task paradigms and one dual task paradigm). Below is a timeline and rough estimate of 
the time it will take to complete each component of the study:- 
 
1. One day before the experiment, participants will complete this Informed Consent 
Form (should they wish to participate), the Marlowe-Crowne Scale of Social 
Desirability, and the Trait subscale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Time to 
complete – 10-15 minutes). 
2. On the day of, prior to the experiment, participants will complete the State subscale of 
the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, allocating them into either the Low or High 
Anxiety group for the study (Time to complete – 5-10 minutes). 
3. Primary Task 1 – an anticipatory-tennis-shot video where participants will estimate 
where the ball will land on their side of the court (Time to complete – 2-3 minutes). 
4. Participants will complete the six-item short-form of the State subscale of the State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory and the Rating Scale of Mental Effort (Time to complete – 2 
minutes). 
5. Primary Task 2 – a random number generation task, in which participants will say out 
loud a random number between 1-9, every second for 2 minutes (Time to complete – 
2 minutes) 
6. Same as Step 4 (Time to complete – 2 minutes). 
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7. Dual Task – a combination of both Primary tasks listed above, performed 
concurrently (Time to complete – 2-3 minutes). 
8. Same as Step 4/6 (Time to complete – 2 minutes). 
 
If you have any questions or queries David will be happy to answer them. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a participant or feel you have been placed at risk you can 
contact Jon Swain and/or Mark Uphill on 01227 767700 on extensions 3211/3184. 
 
A copy of this sheet must be given to the participants for their own future reference 
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Appendix 6 – Excel Spreadsheets. 
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Appendix 7a – SPSS Data Analysis. Paired Samples T-test – Response Accuracy Scores and 
Task Complexity. 
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Appendix 7b – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Scores and Stress Conditions. 
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Appendix 7c – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – Trait Anxiety 
Groups and Response Accuracy Scores. 
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Appendix 7d – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – Trait Anxiety 
Groups, State Anxiety Scores and Response Accuracy Scores. 
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Appendix 7e – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Groups and Response Accuracy Scores. 
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Appendix 7f – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Groups, Trait Anxiety Scores and Response Accuracy Scores. 
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Appendix 7g – SPSS Data Analysis Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Groups and Mental Effort Scores. 
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Appendix 7h – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Groups and Random Number Generation Scores. 
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Appendix 7i – SPSS Data Analysis Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Groups and Redundancy Scores. 
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Appendix 7j – SPSS Data Analysis. Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA – State Anxiety 
Groups and Mean Repetition Gap Scores. 
 
 
  
 
 
